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For much of the past century there was broad acceptance of the stark con-
trast between the state’s involvement in the regulation of the content of
broadcasting and its laissez-faire relationship with the columns of the press.
The ‘failed market’ argument that substantiated regulation of the airwaves
was difficult to counter. Fundamental changes in technology and media
markets have, however, rendered the rationale open to challenge. Some
aspects of the ‘failed market’, such as frequency scarcity, simply do not
apply in the digital age. This article examines the nature of media regula-
tion in New Zealand, noting its similarity to the dichotomous approach in
Britain, Canada and Australia but also its divergence toward a more neo-
liberal market model that largely limits statutory oversight to matters that
fall broadly into the categories of morals and ethics. It argues that, given
the New Zealand Government’s decision more than 15 years ago to forego
regulation of ownership or the mechanisms that would serve the public
good aspirations of a Reithian model, the continuing role of the state in
regulation of broadcasting is questionable. A replacement model could be
based on an effective regulatory body already present in the New Zealand
media industry—the Advertising Standards Authority.
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ABSTRACT
IN 1938 a former editor of The Times, Henry Wickham Steed, stated thatthe ‘underlying principle that governs, or should govern, the Press is thatthe gathering and selling of news and views is essentially a public trust’.
He believed it was a form of trust akin to that of a doctor and patient but
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potentially more dangerous when dishonoured. Like the medical practitioner,
the journalist enjoyed such trust in part because there existed mechanisms to
call to account those who breached it. In Wickham Steed’s day it was the
power of the courts alone. Today, journalism in what may be called the Brit-
ish tradition retains a tenuous hold on that trust by supplementing legal con-
straint with second-tier regulation.
Newspapers and magazines have enjoyed a freedom from state control
—other than legal constraint and remedy—that suggested Milton’s
Areopagitica defence of the printing press has continued to ring in politi-
cians’ ears. Perhaps also influenced by the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution, Westminster-style governments have shown a continu-
ing reluctance to engage in statutory control over the content of print media
in peacetime. It is a reticence that has not extended to broadcasting and New
Zealand is one of many nations that claim a level of oversight over broadcast-
ers that is not extended to their print counterparts.
This article will outline the systems in New Zealand that regulate content
of print and electronic media, explore the way in which these systems operate
and examine how they are perceived by the public. It will then address the
diminished basis on which one is subject to state authority while the other has
its own form of comparable accountability, and will consider how that basis
may be further eroded by media convergence. It will conclude by suggesting
the wider adoption of an existing regulatory model that has the virtues of self-
regulation and the maintenance of public trust. It is appropriate, however, to
begin with the mechanics of media regulation in New Zealand.
The regulators
Three principal bodies provide avenues for complaint about the content of
New Zealand media and the performance of those connected with them. The
bodies are the New Zealand Press Council, the Advertising Standards Au-
thority and the Broadcasting Standards Authority. Only the latter is a Govern-
ment-appointed statutory body. The other organisations emerged from a tra-
dition of self-regulation in the print media.
The Press Council was established in 1972 by newspaper proprietors and
the journalists’ union as a hasty response, some believe, to the suggestion that
an incoming Labour Government was considering a statutory press body (Tully
& Elsaka, 2002). The Newspaper Publishers Association (NPA) and the En-
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gineering, Printing and Manufacturing Union (EPMU) remain the council’s
constituent bodies. The costs of the council are met by industry bodies. Mem-
bership of the council is a mix of industry and public representatives with the
public members required to hold a majority. Five persons represent the public
and are chosen by a panel comprising a nominee of the NPA, a nominee of the
EPMU, the current council chairperson and the New Zealand Chief Ombuds-
man. Industry representation comprises two NPA appointees, two EPMU ap-
pointees and one appointee from the Magazine Publishers Association. The
chairperson, who must be unconnected with the press and who effectively
represents the public’s casting vote, is chosen by the panel for a five-year
term. By convention this post is filled by a retired High Court judge. The
Hon. Barry Patterson, QC, replaced Sir John Jeffries as chairman on July 1.
The council has three objectives:
• Consideration of complaints about the conduct of the Press and of
     others in relation to the press;
• Promotion of freedom of speech and freedom of the press;
• Maintenance of highest professional standards by the press.
The vast majority of newspapers and magazines accept Press Council
jurisdiction and the body has taken the view that it may also consider com-
plaints against those publications that have not formally submitted to its over-
sight. It has done so on a number of occasions. Complaints must first be made
to the publication concerned. If the complainant is dissatisfied with the re-
sponse or receives no reply, a complaint may be laid with the council. The
council informs the publication of the details of the complaint and seeks a
response which is forwarded to the complainant for comment before the council
begins its adjudication. Publications are not required to publish adjudications
that are not upheld (but may do so) but each organisation that has accepted
Press Council jurisdiction undertake to publish adjudications where a com-
plaint against it is upheld.
There are a number of caveats to the complaint process. Complainants
must waive their rights to legal remedy before the council considers matters
that could have that recourse. The complaints procedure outlined in its an-
nual reports states that this is to avoid the council being used as a ‘trial run’
for litigation. Complaints are considered in private and the parties are not
legally represented although they may appear in person (few do so and in
2004 only three complainants appeared before the council). There is no right
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of appeal, although the council will re-consider cases where material errors
of fact can be shown. The council has no power to fine or otherwise punish
offenders.
Council deliberations rely on both precedent set by previous adjudications
and reference to a Statement of Principles adopted in 1999. The statement
includes references to accuracy, privacy, confidentiality, advocacy, discrimi-
nation and subterfuge and sets guidelines for corrections, headline and cap-
tion writing, reporting on children and young people, photographs, the dis-
tinction between comment and fact, and letters to the editor.
An analysis of adjudications can be found in Table 1. Increasingly, com-
plainants are using the council’s Statement of Principles against which to
register their complaints. In 2002, the council stated in its annual report that
the number of complainants citing principles had risen from 42 percent in
2000 to 63 percent in 2002. The nature of complaints shows only minor vari-
ation from year to year and generally follows the pattern of 2004.
 Until 1970, all broadcasting in New Zealand was state-owned and pri-
vate television was not introduced until 1989, which may suggest a residual
proprietorial attitude that, in small part at least, explains why print media are
free from state oversight but radio and television in New Zealand fall under
the jurisdiction of the Broadcasting Standards Authority, a Crown Entity es-
tablished in the sweeping reforms to broadcasting embodied in the Broad-
casting Act 1989. The BSA is responsible for programme standards but not
the programme mix. Beyond a charter that requires the state-owned commer-
cial television broadcaster, TVNZ, to feature programmes that reflect and
enhance New Zealand’s character (under the Television New Zealand Act 2003,
TVNZ has the unenviable task of trying to give effect to public broadcasting
objectives while maintaining its commercial performance), the state’s hold
on what New Zealanders see is limited to provision of a funding body. This is
the Broadcasting Commission (which operates under the title NZ on Air),
and it makes grants to applicants for programmes that meet ‘public good’
objectives. The commission also funds the operation of the two state-owned
non-commercial radio networks, National Radio and ConcertFM.
The Broadcasting Standards Authority is funded by an appropriation from
Parliament and by a levy on broadcasters. The BSA comprises four members,
appointed by the Governor-General on the advice of the Minister of Broad-
casting. The chair must be a barrister or solicitor of not less than seven years’
experience. One member is appointed after consultation with broadcasters
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Table 1:  Press Council adjudications, 2002-2004
and another with public interest groups. The current chair, Joanne Morris, is
also a member of the Waitangi Tribunal that considers Maori grievances un-
der the Treaty of Waitangi.
The authority’s mandated tasks include:
• Receiving and determining complaints about alleged breaches of codes
    of broadcasting practice;
• Encouraging broadcasters to develop codes for its approval on a range
    of issues of ethics and taste;
• Conducting research on broadcasting standards.
Unlike the Press Council, the BSA has the ability to order publication of
an approved statement when a breach has been determined. In addition it can
both impose fines and deny a broadcaster advertising revenue by requiring it
to transmit commercial-free for up to 24 hours. While fines (up to a limit of
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NZ$5000), characterised as compensation, have been routinely imposed on
broadcasters, the somewhat Draconian denial of revenue provision has rarely
been applied (Day, 2000). Failure to comply with an order by the authority is
an offence carrying a fine of up to $100,000. Its decisions may be appealed to
the High Court and both broadcasters and complainants have done so (Bur-
rows & Cheer, 1999).
In the five years to June 2004, the BSA issued an average of 214 deci-
sions a year (roughly three times that of the Press Council), upholding about
25 percent. Complaints, 68 percent of which were against television broad-
casters in 2004, relate largely to good taste, fairness and accuracy, and pri-
vacy. The number of complaints and decisions rose rapidly after the estab-
lishment of the authority and for the past five reported years has averaged
about 190 a year (See Table 2).
Neither the Press Council nor the Broadcasting Standards Authority deal
with complaints regarding advertising. The BSA initially had responsibility
for broadcast advertising but in 1993 that task was passed to the Advertising
Standards Authority, a self-regulating industry body that already handled com-
plaints about press advertising. The ASA has two independent complaints
bodies: the Advertising Standards Complaints Board (ASCB) and the Adver-
tising Standards Complaints Appeal Board. (ASCAB) The ASCB has eight
members—four public members with no media connections and four indus-
try representatives—plus a public member chairperson who has a casting
vote. The ASCAB has three members, two of whom (including the chairper-
son) must be public members. An upheld complaint may result in the with-
drawal of an advertisement or a refusal of media to carry it. Decisions are
made public. In 2004 the ASCB considered 257 complaints, of which 48
percent were upheld or settled. Fifty-three decisions were appealed, 35 of
which were not accepted for consideration. Of the 18 decisions considered,
six appeals were allowed and one was settled.
While both the Press Council and the BSA are concerned with consider-
ing complaints and upholding appropriate standards, both bodies have also
entered into areas of advocacy. In so doing both are fulfilling their remits.
However, the difference between the two bodies is apparent in their empow-
ering documents. The Press Council’s constitution requires it to uphold the
principles of freedom of speech and of the press but deals with objectives
only in general terms. Section 21 of the Broadcasting Act 1989 gives the BSA
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Table 2:  BSA adjudications, 1990-2004
not only authority for the maintenance of standards but a strong catalytic role
in their creation. The Act prescribes the areas in which that advocacy should
lie and, unlike the Press Council’s mandate in favour of free expression, is
predicated on an assumption of the need for public safeguards against what
might be seen as injurious publication. Those differences have dictated the
direction in which each organisation has taken its advocacy role.
In his final annual overview in the Press Council’s annual report for 2004,
Sir John Jeffries devoted a significant section to press freedom and the coun-
cil’s role. He said:
Though no journalist in this country feels physically threatened for
merely doing their job that does not mean defenders of press freedom
can pack up their tools and go home. In democracies like this, attacks
usually take a more sophisticated form. And whatever form they come
in, attacks need to be firmly repelled.
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Jeffries describes press freedom as ‘a battle the Press Council is proud to help
wage’. Several recent complaints to the council illustrate how it has done so.
A complaint was made against The New Zealand Herald for carrying com-
ments by ‘a self-confessed climate-change agnostic’ in an article on global
warming. The complaint, by a professor from the University of Virginia’s
environmental sciences department, claimed the article was inaccurate, lacked
balance and showed excessive advocacy. The council did not uphold the com-
plaint, commenting:
The press’s requirements ensure a...popular and general approach to
the most arcane subjects and wide-ranging, mass-readership publica-
tions will report minority views and even opinions that may be mani-
festly counter to the prevailing wisdom, or even wrong...Advocates of
a particular standpoint may not find the press always serving their pur-
pose, but then the function of the press is to serve their readers in the
broadest sense. (Press Council Adjudications 2004, Case 962)
In another case brought against The Press (Christchurch) and The New Zea-
land Herald by the New Zealand Immigration Service (Press Council
Adjudications 2004, Cases 983 & 984), the council found itself weighing
statutory secrecy against the right to report the proceedings of Parliament.
Both newspapers had published the name of a man seeking refugee status
after he had been named during a parliamentary debate. The Immigration
Service claimed publication was a breach of the man’s statutory right to con-
fidentiality under the Immigration Act. In a lengthy adjudication the council
relied on the authority of Lord Denning M.R. in Attorney-General v Times
Newspapers Ltd which mentioned the Bill of Rights 1688 before stating:
‘Whatever comments are made in Parliament, they can be repeated in the
newspapers without any fear of an action for libel or proceedings for con-
tempt of court.’ The council’s adjudication said that ‘in the absence of direct
New Zealand authority the council considers it prudent to follow the English
case. To do otherwise might suggest primacy of the courts over Parliament’.
The council has been active in international circles in the promotion of
press freedom and has acted as an adviser in the setting up of a press com-
plaints procedure in the Kingdom of Tonga where such freedom has been
under concerted attack (See Robie, 2004).
If the Press Council has gained a reputation as a defender of press free-
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dom, the Broadcasting Standards Authority has established itself at the fore-
front in establishing a balance between that freedom and the right of an indi-
vidual to privacy. Privacy is embodied in a set of adjudication principles de-
veloped by the authority during the course of its early deliberation on com-
plaints in that area. However, the BSA has a statutory right under the Broad-
casting Amendment Act 2000 to require the development of a separate pri-
vacy code which would be a binding form of restraint on broadcasters. In late
2001 it decided to conduct research into privacy and informed consent issues.
The result of that research was a monograph, published in 2004, entitled Real
Media Real People: Privacy and Informed Consent in Broadcasting. The
authority chair, Joanne Morris, said in a foreword that as a result of the re-
search, there seemed little desire for a separate code but there was a sugges-
tion that existing principles be re-examined.
There are several striking findings in this research. The first is that
there is a gulf between the general public’s understanding of the rights
of individuals when featuring in the media, and the actual legal position
of those individuals. This suggests that better, more accessible infor-
mation might be useful so that the public clearly understands both its
rights and obligations and  the rights and obligations of the media to go
about their professional tasks. The second is the degree of unanimity
between various stakeholder groups and members of the public on some
key issues. Almost all respect the principle that protection of children
and the vulnerable is highly important. Many agree that public figures
have less right to privacy on important issues than ordinary members of
the public. What does this mean in practice? Should individuals have
complete control over the use of recordings/images in which they fea-
ture?—in law and in practice no, but many individuals disagree. Should
a consent form always be used—it is impractical for some areas of
media e.g. news gathering and most radio interviews, but may be sensi-
ble for longer-form programmes, and competitive formats where par-
ticipation is sought by the individual. If the method of gaining informa-
tion is intrusive (e.g. hidden cameras), but there is a justified suspicion
of wrongdoing, are privacy principles less important?—no, but the public
interest is a valid defence. Are there special issues in recording Maori
people?—yes.
The authority has built up a large number of precedent-setting decisions on
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privacy. Between July 1998 and December 2003 it dealt with 132 privacy
complaints of which 48 were upheld. The authority’s seven-point set of pri-
vacy principles provides protection for the ordinary citizen but a number of
cases cited by Michael Stace (Stace, 2004) in a wide-ranging discussion of
the application of the principles also reveals a minefield for broadcasters.
• A 1999 complaint against Television New Zealand’s Holmes current
affairs programme found that in spite of parental consent, the privacy of an
eight-year-old child with attention deficit disorder had been breached because
his permission had not been given to film him (Decision 1999-087/089).
• In a programme that revealed a child’s paternity, his privacy had been
breached even though both parents had given their permission for filming
(Decision 1999-093/101)
• While it is generally considered that filming is permitted in a public
place, the authority has ruled that intrusion can occur there. It ruled that film-
ing an injured person climbing out of a car after an accident was a breach
(Decision 2003-043)
It would be wrong, however, to suggest the authority has no regard for
the public’s legitimate right to know. It does pay attention to public interest
defences in complaints alleging breach of privacy. Stace set out the way in
which the authority determines privacy complaints:
   The procedure the Authority now applies before assessing a privacy
complaint is to determine whether the person whose privacy is alleged
to have been breached is in fact an identifiable individual. Once the
Authority has determined that there has been an apparent breach of
privacy, it then assesses, if raised, the broadcaster’s contention that the
complainant consented to the broadcast.
   In the case of children, the Authority requires assurance from the
broadcaster regardless of parental consent, that it has taken the best
interests of the child into account. With adults, the Authority looks
closely at the circumstances in which an all-encompassing release form
has been signed. It also accepts that consent may be implied by the
complainant’s actions.
   Broadcasters often argue that the disclosure of the information con-
tained in the broadcast is justified in the public interest. Indeed, the
circumstances in which  this matter is raised frequently involve what
would otherwise be a clear breach of an individual’s privacy.  While the
Authority insists that the information disclosed must be in the public
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interest. and not merely of public interest, it accepts that disclosure in
the public interest overrides an individual  right to privacy.
   Because of the importance of the factual situation of each complaint
and the range of situations with which the Authority is required to deal,
it is difficult to generalise about what factual situations amount to a
breach of privacy. It can be noted, however, that a person shown par-
ticipating in criminal behaviour is unlikely to have a privacy complaint
upheld.
The BSA has been the public’s principal conduit through which claims for
breach of privacy have been pursued. Certainly the number of complaints
(about 20 a year) far exceed those to the Press Council (five in 2004). How-
ever, there is growing acceptance that the Court of Appeal judgment in Hosking
v Runting & Otrs (which involved the photographing of a television celebri-
ty’s children in a public place), while unsuccessful, has established a tort of
privacy in New Zealand. Although the judgement set a high threshold for
success in such claims, the future may see the courts becoming an alternative
to the BSA in some cases.
Burrows and Cheer have been generous in their praise of both the BSA
and the Press Council, stating that ‘the BSA’s decisions continue to contrib-
ute much to the standards of ethical journalism in New Zealand broadcasting’
and that the Press Council’s adjudications, in addition to contributing much
to the practice of journalism in New Zealand, ‘reinforce a number of funda-
mental ethical principles that supplement the ‘real law’ applied in the courts’.
Attitudes toward the regulators
Such praise may reflect the objective view of two of the country’s leading
academics in media law but the positions taken by both the BSA and the Press
Council inevitably bring them into conflict with either the media, their sub-
jects or the public in general.
In August 2004 the BSA published the results of a survey of complain-
ants who submitted formal complaints in 2003. Conducted by the research
company Colmar Brunton, the survey involved both qualitative telephone
interviews (10) which informed the design of a self-completion question-
naire sent to 123 complainants, 66 per cent of whom returned completed
questionnaires. More than half were first-time complainants, 31 per cent had
made two to three complaints and 10 percent had made four or more com-
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plaints. Twenty nine percent felt the final decision by the authority was either
‘very fair’ or ‘fair’. Forty percent felt it was unfair and 20 per cent felt it was
very unfair. However, the researchers noted a strong correlation between per-
ceptions of fairness and whether or not the decision was in the complainants’
favour. The complaints process itself was generally positive, with 62 per cent
believing that they had had the opportunity to voice their concerns and on
most aspects of the process positive and neutral comments outweighed the
negative. However, as the researchers noted, ‘there were significant propor-
tions of complainants who struggled with some elements of the process and
held poor perceptions of the process overall’. Nonetheless, many of the is-
sues revealed by the survey appear to be administrative rather than concep-
tual. In its 2005 Statement of Intent, the BSA highlighted, as a priority, the
need to make improvements to its complaints processes.
On the other side of the ledger, however, there is disquiet among broad-
casters over what they regard as inconsistent decisions by the authority. As
well as privacy issues, broadcasters have found themselves facing differing
interpretations of offensive material, what is permissible after the 8.30 pm
‘watershed’ and when the use of graphic footage is justified in news bulletins
(See Decision 1999-064 v  Decision 2001-211; Decision 1998-090/1 v Deci-
sion 2002-029 and Decision 1999-080 v  Decision 2001-212. Decisions car-
ried on BSA website www.bsa.govt.nz).
The Press Council has not canvassed its complainants to seek their views
but has, from time to time, sought public comment on its operations. It was as
a result of such consultation—and criticism—that it adopted its statement of
principles in 1998. To that point, complainants had no clear guidelines on
which to base their applications for redress. There has been similar criticism
of the lack of an appeals process within the Press Council. In spite of this, the
council has resisted calls for another body to review its decisions, opting
instead for a procedure whereby it will re-examine cases if new evidence or
disclosure of material error can be provided.
The most strident criticism of the council in recent times has been by a
National Party Member of Parliament, Murray McCully. One of his party’s
principal political strategists, McCully in July 2004 launched an attack on the
media in which he said the council ‘has been long discarded as a serious
regulator of professional standards by practitioners such as myself’. Set against
the background of a recent Sunday newspaper article that compared the Na-
tional Party leader, Dr Don Brash, and right-wing Australian activist Pauline
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Hanson, McCully told the National Press Club that his party had decided
against complaining to the Press Council about the article, which he described
as ‘malicious, unprofessional, offensive, unethical, inaccurate, unbalanced
and unfair’. He said the decision not to complain to the council was ‘about
the most resounding vote of no confidence we could express in that organisa-
tion and its processes’. He said the council was a body with few clear rules,
‘other than the ones they make up along the way’, and was dominated by a
small number of media chains. He was also critical of the time the council
took to deal with complaints, saying most complainants were statistically
likely to be dead before their complaint was dealt with.
McCully’s criticism has not translated into party policy promising changes
to press regulation. However, it did highlight a number of issues with which
the council has yet to effectively grapple. One is the perception—not borne
out by the membership structure of the council—that it is dominated by the
media companies. A public majority of one may be sufficient to ensure that
the public hold sway but perception and reality are seldom resolved by refer-
ence to slim margins. Increased public representation would help to over-
come suggestions of media domination. Secondly, the council already uses
its Statement of Principles in adjudications but the preamble is equivocal—
‘these Principles are not a rigid code, but may be used by complainants should
they wish to point the Council more precisely to the nature of their com-
plaint’. That does not instil confidence in the process. If the council is  refer-
encing complaints against the principles, it seems a short step to say unequivo-
cally that it will apply them in adjudications. However, it is the council’s
resistance to an appeal process that is, perhaps, the most puzzling. Both the
BSA and the ASA have established processes for appealing decisions.
The Press Council is alone among the oversight bodies in denying that
additional level of redress.  In New Zealand the council functions less as a
mediating body than as a ‘judicial’ one. It does not act as an intermediary but
as an adjudicator. In theory, a complainant or the ‘accused’ could seek a judi-
cial review of a council decision but such recourse lacks the virtue of in-built
transparency and even, perhaps, natural justice (given the cost of taking the
matter to court). An appeal process would provide both. As for McCully’s
death-before-satisfaction criticism, the council over the past three years has
had between seven and 10 complaints carried over into the following year, an
average of about 10 percent.
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Comparable regulators
A direct comparison with the three nations most often referenced against New
Zealand— Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom—is somewhat prob-
lematic given that all three countries maintain public broadcasting systems
that are either wholly or substantially funded directly by the state or through
public licence fees. State-owned radio in New Zealand may fit the model, but
commercially-operated TVNZ cannot, in spite of the laudable aims of its
charter.
Some comparisons, however, may be made. All three countries operate
forms of self-regulating press complaints bodies. The Australian Press Coun-
cil, the United Kingdom’s Press Complaints Commission and Canada’s pro-
vincial press councils operate along broadly similar lines to that of New Zea-
land’s press body. Each has a mix of public and industry representatives, all
hear complaints and all have either guidelines or codes against which those
complaints are considered. All, like New Zealand, are based on redress rather
than punishment.
All three countries have state regulation of broadcasting media and have
moved to aggregate regulatory functions covering all aspects of broadcasting
and telecommunications under single authorities. The Canadian Radio-tel-
evision and Telecommunications Commission’s members are appointed by
the Canadian Cabinet and report to Parliament through the Minister of Cana-
dian Heritage. They are subject to orders from Cabinet. The CRTC, estab-
lished in 1968, has up to 13 fulltime and six part-time commissioners and a
staff of 400. It is both a licensing and a complaints body and has a strong
mandate to promote Canadian content. Last year it was involved in contro-
versial decisions over the provision of international services on cable televi-
sion. It approved carriage of the Arab satellite network Al Jazeera but only
after meeting Canadian Jewish Congress concerns by requiring the editing
out of hate speech; refused carriage of Italian network RAI because it com-
peted with a Canadian Italian-language service; and delayed but finally al-
lowed a digital licence for Fox News.
Both Britain and Australia are latecomers to the integration of electronic
regulation. In 2003 the United Kingdom merged five regulatory authorities
into the Office of Communications (Ofcom). It has a current staffing level of
about 750 (a 32 percent reduction on its predecessors). Ofcom regulates both
telecommunications and broadcasting, requiring the latter not only to meet
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codified programme standards but also imposing content quotas on free-to-
air services. In 2004 it proposed a new broadcasting code, consolidating the
six separate codes for television and radio that it had inherited, which it im-
plemented in mid-2005. In 2004-2005 it considered 4184 programme com-
plaints, of which 3994 were complaints about programme standards (75 per-
cent not upheld) and the remainder over fairness or alleged breaches of pri-
vacy (85 percent not upheld, not entertained or discontinued).
Australia’s electronic regulator, the Australian Communication and Me-
dia Authority (ACMA) came into being on July 1, 2005 with the merging of
the Australian Communications Authority and the Australian Broadcasting
Authority with a combined staff of about 500. The ACMA has, at least as an
interim measure, adopted the programme standards developed by the ABA.
Unlike its British and Canadian counterparts, the ACMA also has control
over internet content and can require Australian content providers to remove
prohibited material from Australian-hosted websites and advise service pro-
viders of appropriate filters for foreign-hosted content. Broadly speaking it
can act against providers of material (on open websites) that would be re-
stricted or banned by Australia’s film classification body.
All three cross-sector regulators have eschewed adjudicating on televi-
sion and radio advertising. That function has variously been devolved to Ad-
vertising Standards Canada, Britain’s Advertising Standards Authority and
the Australian Advertising Standards Bureau.
New Zealand has no similar cross-sector regulatory body and there ap-
pears to be no pressure for the BSA and the Broadcasting Commission (NZ
on Air) to merge with those elements of the Commerce Commission that
currently regulate the telecommunications industries. Nor is there any indica-
tion that the Government will move away from a price-bidding system of
commercial spectrum allocation.
Who should regulate?
While the media in New Zealand, as elsewhere, is regularly criticised over
content, the issue of how it should be regulated and by whom is not, it must
be said, a matter of great current debate. A discussion paper released in Feb-
ruary by the Ministry of Culture and Heritage, that raised the possibility of
wider powers for the BSA, did not engender wide public discussion. That is
unfortunate because changes to media within New Zealand and the emer-
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gence of new regulatory bodies in other countries suggest, I believe that such
a debate should take place. However, contrary to what some may see as the
conventional wisdom of the state providing a bulwark against globalised media,
I would argue that the established reasons for state involvement in the regula-
tion of expression have been systematically broken down. The digital future
is one in which convergence will render delivery methods immaterial and the
replacement of single-medium organisations with multimedia structures will
be complete. As the future unfolds it will be increasingly difficult to clearly
differentiate between print and broadcasting (streaming video and custom-
ised newspapers will be downloaded to the one device)  and, hence, the di-
chotomous treatment of print and broadcast media will be increasingly ques-
tionable.
Hallin and Mancini (2004) noted in their discussion of the media model
in north and central Europe that the political culture in those countries dem-
onstrated the strength of civil society ‘and a tendency to devolve to institu-
tions of civil society functions that otherwise might be exercised by the state’.
While they go on to discuss the way in which those states treat broadcasting
as a continuing part of res publica, they believe that strong press councils
make state intervention less important that it might otherwise be. It seems but
an extension of this view to suggest that, if the community is prepared to
allow print media to be governed by robust self-administering accountability
systems, it has no grounds to demand that broadcast media must be held ac-
countable to a statutory body on issues in the same plane.
The regulatory distinction has already become tattered at the edges.
Founded on the twin justifications of scarce frequencies and intrusive power,
the regulation of broadcasting—further legitimised by the state’s claim to
sovereign rights over the radio spectrum—was a broadly-accepted concept
for most of the twentieth century. Broadcasting was seen as an example of
‘market failure’ that required government intervention (Krattenmaker & Powe
1994). There was a need, under that orthodox view, for state control of both
the ownership and content of broadcasting  and, even in the free-market United
States, this was the practice for decades. For the past 25 years in New Zea-
land, however, the government has exercised virtually no control over the
type or level of ownership, nor has it been moved to place programming
requirements on all broadcasters.
The place of technological determinism is, I believe, undeniable. Digital
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technology renders the ‘scarce frequency’ justification redundant: high ca-
pacity digital satellite and cable delivery make hundreds of channels a real-
ity; and digital delivery reduces reliance on the radio spectrum. To further
erode the distinction, the internet is capable of functioning as a radio or tel-
evision receiver via the telephone lines.
The same technological changes have put a question mark over the issue
of undue influence. Audience fragmentation and subscription services put
power in the hands of the consumer. While network television may continue
to command more than half the viewership even in mature multi-channel en-
vironments and Katz’s theory on the sharply declining effect of television has
been challenged (Curran, 2002), choice and the range of content has undoubt-
edly increased exponentially since the ‘influence’ justification was devel-
oped. It is reasonable to suggest that, at least, ‘influence’ is less than in the
past. And to choice must be added the new demand for people’s time pre-
sented by massive growth in use of the internet.
 The internet may provide some guidance to the future direction of media
oversight. It has been regarded as ungovernable, although national security,
property rights and child pornography have led to some revision of that view
(van Cuilenburg & McQuail, 2003). Its potential contribution to a Habermasian
public sphere has fed the argument in favour of minimal regulation. Counter-
ing that argument has been the threat that global media oligopolies will also
colonise cyberspace and its regulation may become a political issue (Herman
& McChesney, 1997). The February 2005 UNESCO International Confer-
ence on Freedom of Expression in Cyberspace in Paris encouraged the devel-
opment of guidelines for the legal underpinning of commercial Internet en-
terprises but warned explicitly against regulation that could inhibit the free
flow of information. While not going so far as to suggest a stripping away of
accountability in traditional media, the Internet debate, nonetheless, goes to
the heart of the issue of media regulation: the need to set the limit for where
government may tread.
McChesney (2003) is correct when he dismisses the argument that dig-
ital technology renders regulation obsolete: multiplicity is not a substitute for
accountability. However, Sunstein (1997) offers useful advice in setting some
boundaries. The constitutional issues do not change simply through the intro-
duction of new technologies. Any government, not simply that of the United
States, has a role in fulfilling the Madisonian ideal of media as a tool of
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democracy and that legitimises both anti-monopolistic regulation and guar-
antees of access. A government also has a legitimate role in policing ‘control-
lable’ speech such as obscenity, false and misleading commercial speech and
libel but this should stand alongside a Madisonian commitment to free speech.
Such general principles are important, but it is not the present purpose to
argue generally for the relative merits and demerits of state authority and
self-regulation. Rather it is to deal with the specifics of the New Zealand
case, not as it might be but as it is.
Let us consider the areas over which New Zealanders—through Parlia-
ment—have indicated they wish to see some oversight. Those areas include:
• Programme standards
• Fairness and balance
• Privacy
They have not included ownership restrictions, programme-based licence
requirements, programme quotas, or publicly-funded non-commercial televi-
sion services, most of which have figured in New Zealand’s past but which
do not appear to be part of its future. While the future provision of public
service broadcasting in New Zealand is a debate that should also be encour-
aged, for our purposes we may assume that the focus of media oversight in
New Zealand is ethical and moral, not cultural or commercial.
It is on that basis that I question the role of a government-initiated regu-
latory framework for broadcasting in place of the self-administered media
accountability system to which the press has bound itself. Ethics and morals
are, I believe, the very stuff that M*A*S are designed to oversee. While not
denying the place of government in the delineating of  moral standards (over
matters such as pornography, for example), the issues with which the BSA
might grapple sit within the limits that the law imposes, not outside them. If
they are within the law, why are the broadcasters subject to statutory control?
Curran (2002), in a penetrating analysis of the schools of media criti-
cism, refers to media regulation as attempts ‘to ensure that the media serve
the needs of society rather than simply the private interests of shareholders’.
It is clear from the limited powers conferred on the BSA—extant for some
years—that successive governments have foregone such a role.
Section 14 of New Zealand’s Bill of Rights Act states that ‘everyone has
the right to freedom of expression, including the freedom to seek, receive and
impart information and opinions of any kind in any form.’ Section 5 of the
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Act says that limitations on this and other guaranteed freedoms should be
confined to ‘such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society’. After allowing for the Millian
principle of prevention of actual harm or the imminent threat of it, how can
the state assume a statutory role in the moral and ethical conduct of the media
without breaching not one but both of those provisions? The state should not
be the media’s moral minder.
That is not to deny the need for standards and accountability. That ac-
countability begins within each organisation. In-house codes of conduct are a
patch-work in the New Zealand media and suggest fertile ground for further
study. Part of the price all media should be willing to pay for an absence of
state authority over them is a robust and accessible code of conduct. The
other price to be paid is acceptance of an autonomous public accountability
system.
Conclusion
This article began by recalling the cornerstone of the media—public trust. A
pre-requisite to gaining that trust is unambiguous accountability. Baroness
Onora O’Neill in the 2002 BBC Reith Lectures suggested this is not to be
achieved through micro-management and central control but through good
governance.
Such governance will not earn the public’s trust unless the public itself
plays a leading role. No matter how well-intentioned state appointees may
be, a statutory system is open to allegations of ‘stacking’ to reflect the gov-
ernment’s own leanings (a charge made by McCully against the BSA in his
2004 criticism of the media). For their part, the media acting as their own
judge and jury leads understandably to charges that they are self-serving (a
criticism that McCully levelled at the Press Council). The solution must be a
system that is not open to either charge and which embodies both transpar-
ency and efficacy. It must be a system that has an overt public majority, clear
guidelines and set processes for reviewing its decisions. Ironically, the model
can be found in the unashamedly commercial arm of the media—advertising.
The Advertising Standards Authority, Advertising Standards Complaints
Board and the Advertising Standards Complaints Appeal Board are bodies
that enjoy the support of electronic and print media, the Government and the
public (In 2004, the ASCB received 777 complaints, which is the highest ever
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received in one year and some indication of public trust).1  A 2003 review of
the advertising of therapeutic products in Australia and New Zealand, pre-
pared by Mike Codd who is a former head of the Australian Prime Minister’s
Department and latterly chancellor of Wollongong University, held up New
Zealand’s self-regulatory regime as a model worthy of emulation across the
Tasman.
 The advertising bodies form a model that, with some modification and
the adoption of the best features of both the BSA and the Press Council, could
produce a model media accountability system.
An all-media standards body could be formed on the ASCB/ASCAB model
(but separate from those bodies that would continue to adjudicate on adver-
tising) so long as it had a significant majority of public members, a transpar-
ent appointment process utilising the Office of the Ombudsman, a former
member of the judiciary at its head, a mediation service as an intermediate
stage between initial complaint to a media operator and formal complaint,
plus meaningful powers of redress.
Removing the state from regulation of legitimate free expression is a
laudable aim. So, too, is the creation of a body with jurisdiction over both
electronic and print media. It would not only account for convergence but
also remove the current double standard over standards.
Note
1 The 777 complaints filed in 2004 included 263 duplicates; 180 were rejected
for various reasons and 22 were withdrawn or resolved. The total of substantive com-
plaints was 459 of which 257 went to decisions.
References
Broadcasting Standards Authority (2004). Real media, real people: Privacy and in-
formed consent in broadcasting. Palmerston North: Dunmore Press.
Burrows, J., and  Cheer,U. (1999). Media law in New Zealand. Auckland: Oxford
University Press.
Colmar Brunton (2004, August). Broadcasting Standards Authority Complaints Sur-
vey Research Report.
Curran, J. (2002). Media and power. London: Routledge.
Day, P. (2000). Voice and vision. Auckland: Auckland University Press.
Krattenmaker, T.G., and Powe, L. A. Jr. (1994). Regulating broadcast programming.
Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
Codd, M. (2003). Review of advertising therapeutic goods in Australia and New
Zealand. Commonwealth of Australia.
 PACIFIC JOURNALISM REVIEW 11 (2) 2005  83
MEDIA ETHICS AND ACCOUNTABILITY
Hallin, D.C., and Mancini P. (2004). Comparing media systems: Three models of
media and politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lealand, G. (2002). Regulation—what regulation? Cultural diversity and local con-
tent in New Zealand television. In Farnsworth J. and I. Hutchison I., New Zealand
television: A reader. Palmerston North: Dunmore Press.
McChesney, R.W. (2003). Theses on media deregulation. Media, Culture & Society,
Vol 25, pp. 125-133.
McCully, M. (2004, July 22). Speech to National Press Club. (Retrieved 8 July 2005)
www.national.org.nz/Article.aspx?ArticleID=2437
New Zealand Press Council. (2004). Annual Report 2004.
Ofcom Annual Report 2004-5. (Retrieved 24 July 2005)
www.ofcom.org.uk/about/reports_plans/annrep0405
Robie, D. (2004). The sword of Damocles in the South Pacific: Two media regulatory
case studies. Pacific Journalism Review, 10(1): 103-122.
Spicer, B., Powell, M. and Emanuel, D. (2002). A brief history of television in New
Zealand. In Farnsworth J. and I. Hutchison, New Zealand television: A reader
(pp. 199-230) . Palmerston North: Dunmore Press.
Stace, M. (2004). The BSA’s regulatory framework: Recent decisions on privacy and
consent. In Broadcasting Standards Authority, Real media, real people: Privacy
and informed consent in broadcasting. Palmerston North: Dunmore Press.
Sunstein, C. (1997). Free markets and social justice. New York: Oxford University
Press.
Tully J., and Elsaka N. (2002). Ethical codes and credibility: The challenge to indus-
try. In McGregor & Comrie (Eds.), What’s news? Reclaiming journalism in New
Zealand (pp. 142-157). Palmerston North: Dunmore Press.
Wickham Steed, H. (1938). The press. London: Penguin.
Gavin Ellis, retired New Zealand Herald editor-in-chief, was presented with
the 2005 Astor Award for Press Freedom at the Commonwealth Press Union
conference in Sydney in March. He worked at the Herald in editorial and
management roles for 32 of his 40 years in journalism. He is now engaged in
postgraduate studies and tutoring with the University of Auckland.
gavin.ellis@xtra.co.nz

